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CONCLUSION
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.1
—Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis
A statute with this purpose is invalid because the
means chosen by the State to further the interest in
potential life must be calculated to inform the
woman’s free choice, not hinder it. And a statute
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
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which, while furthering the interest in potential life
or some other valid state interest, has the effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible
means of serving its legitimate ends.2
INTRODUCTION
Arizona has a reputation for having some of the most restrictive
abortion laws in the United States.3 In recent years, Arizona has
passed increasingly novel legislation, and has pushed the boundaries
of post-Casey abortion limitations.4 While most states have molded
their regulations after the Pennsylvania laws at issue in Casey,5 some,
like Arizona, have explored uncharted territory by implementing laws
outside of the traditional Casey categories of informed consent, waiting
periods, and regulations of medical facilities.6 Although outside of the
Casey realm, most of these experimental laws, from targeted regula-
tion of abortion providers, or “TRAP laws,” 7 to wholesale bans on par-
tial birth abortions,8 have been upheld as constitutional.
Arizona House Bill 2036, however, contains regulations that
stretch the currently expanded post-Casey limitations, such as a pro-
vision combining a time requirement with a pre-existing ultrasound
requirement, and regulation further expanding TRAP laws.9 At the
same time the bill stretches the present boundaries of abortion law,
it shatters the existing mold, in the form of a time requirement that
bans abortion before viability and by implementing restrictions that
the Supreme Court has expressly prohibited.10
This Note will argue that the recently passed Arizona House Bill
2036 contains restrictions that step too far from the Casey framework,
constitute an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion,
as well as expressly violate the Casey standard by prohibiting abortion
2. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
3. See Jeffrey Roseberry, Note, Undue Burden and the Law of Abortion in Arizona,
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 391, 391 (2012).
4. Id.
5. Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled The Abortion
Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1336 (2009).
6. State Facts About Abortion: Arizona, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 2012), http://www
.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/pdf/arizona.pdf.
7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2006).
9. H.B. 2036, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2012).
10. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 146 (“Before viability, a State ‘may not prohibit any woman
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.’ ”) (quoting Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)).
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during pre-viability of the fetus. Part I will provide background re-
garding abortion law, Part II will briefly comment on state abortion
restrictions post-Casey, Part III will detail Arizona House Bill 2036,
and Part IV will outline how House Bill 2036 conforms to post-Casey
regulations and will argue that the restrictions imposed constitute an
undue burden and therefore breach the viability standard.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROE AND CASEY FRAMEWORK
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court first recognized that a
woman’s implied right to privacy under the Constitution included
her ability to have an abortion.11 However, the Court placed limita-
tions on this right. During the first trimester of the pregnancy, a state
was not permitted to regulate abortion, and the matter was between
the woman and her doctor.12 After the first trimester, but before the
fetus could viably live outside of the mother, the State was permitted
to regulate, but not prohibit, abortion.13 Any state regulation, however,
would be held to a strict scrutiny standard and would thus only be per-
missible if there was a compelling state interest.14 Finally, the Court
decided that the State had a compelling interest in protecting the life
of a viable fetus,15 and thus could entirely ban the procedure at that
stage of the pregnancy.16
States reacted divisively to the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade.
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, and South Dakota enacted
“trigger” laws that would immediately criminalize abortion if the
Supreme Court overturned Roe.17 Fourteen states continued to retain
now unenforceable laws banning abortion.18 Louisiana went so far as
to enact an unenforceable ban on abortion after the Court’s decision in
Roe.19 Between the Court’s decision in Roe and 1989, forty-eight states
enacted some regulation on abortion.20 Because the laws were held to
a strict scrutiny standard requiring a compelling state interest, they
were mostly struck down as a violation of Roe protections.21
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
12. Id. at 164.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 155.
15. Id. at 163 (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential
life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.”).
16. Id. at 163–64 (The State “may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period,
except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”).
17. Near-Total Abortion Bans, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, http://www.pro
choiceamerica.org/what-is-choice/fast-facts/near-total-abortion-bans.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2013).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Devins, supra note 5, at 1326.
21. Id.
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In 1992, the Supreme Court examined a set of abortion regula-
tions from Pennsylvania in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.22 Although
the regulations at issue in Casey were of the same type that had previ-
ously been invalidated under the Roe strict scrutiny standard,23 the
Supreme Court upheld all but one of the abortion restrictions.24 In
doing so, the Court pivoted from the tough strict scrutiny standard in
Roe while affirming Roe’s essential holding that abortion was covered
under the implied right to privacy in the Constitution.25
The Casey Court did, however, abandon the trimester framework
used in Roe.26 Rather than completely disallowing State regulation of
abortion during the first trimester, and holding subsequent pre-viabil-
ity restrictions to strict scrutiny, the Court applied an “undue burden”
standard to regulations on abortion.27 Casey adopted the “viability” re-
quirement that Roe placed on prohibiting the abortion procedure, but
said that any regulation short of a complete ban would be constitu-
tional as long as it did not create an “undue burden” on the woman’s
ability to receive an abortion.28
In addition, the Court further defined the date of viability. During
Roe, a fetus was commonly viable at around twenty-eight weeks,29 but
due to improvements in medical technology, fetal viability began at
around twenty-four weeks when Casey was decided.30 The Court noted
that although the moment of viability had changed from that in Roe,
the standard of viability remained intact as the earliest “time at which
there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life out-
side the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can
in reason and all fairness be the object of State protection that now
overrides the rights of the woman.” 31 After the moment of viability,
defined as indicated by the moment there was a realistic possibility of
the fetus surviving outside of the womb, the State was permitted to
regulate abortion, including prohibiting the procedure.32
Under Casey, laws that regulated abortion before viability would
no longer be viewed with strict scrutiny. Instead, the Court said a law
22. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
23. Devins, supra note 5, at 1318.
24. Casey, 505 U.S. at 898.
25. Id. at 871, 878–79.
26. Id. at 878 (“We reject the rigid trimester framework of Roe v. Wade.”).
27. Id. at 874.
28.  Id. (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability
to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause.” (emphasis added)).
29. Id. at 860.
30. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
31. Id. at 870 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 846 (stating that a State may prohibit abortion after viability as long as there
is an exception for endangering the woman’s health).
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would be invalid if it placed an undue burden on a woman’s ability to
have an abortion.33 The Court applied this undue burden test to the
Pennsylvania State regulations at issue and found that a twenty-four
hour waiting period, a requirement that doctors provide women with
information about the alternatives of the procedure, and a require-
ment for parental consent in the case of a minor seeking an abortion
(with a judicial bypass procedure) were all restrictions that did not
place an undue burden on abortion rights.34
The Court did find, however, that a provision requiring women to
notify their spouses prior to obtaining abortion constituted an undue
burden.35 The Court decided that this provision would be a substan-
tial obstacle36 to women seeking abortions because of potential issues
with domestic violence.37 In its determination of whether the law cre-
ated an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion, the Court
noted that the spousal notification requirement might affect as little
as one percent of women seeking abortions.38 Commenting on this
fact, the Court wrote that “[t]he analysis does not end with the one
percent of women. . . . Legislation is measured for consistency with
the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects. . . .
[The spousal notification provision] will operate as a substantial ob-
stacle . . . is an undue burden, and therefore invalid.” 39 In other words,
when determining whether a law is an undue burden, the Court in-
structs that we look to those whom the legislation will affect, rather
than the population as a whole, to determine if it is likely to place a
substantial obstacle in the way of a woman seeking an abortion and
constitute an undue burden.
Under the undue burden test, any law regulating abortion must
pass a “two-pronged test” in order to be considered a permissible law.40
First, the law must not place an undue burden on the woman.41 The
Supreme Court used the phrase undue burden as “‘a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of
33. Id. at 874.
34. Id. at 885 (expressly overturning the decision in Akron I by validating the twenty-
four hour waiting requirement, an example of the increased leniency of the undue burden
standard over the Roe framework).
35. Id. at 893–94.
36. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893–94 (1992).
37. Id. at 888–93 (detailing data on spousal abuse as it relates to the spousal notifica-
tion requirement).
38. Id. at 894.
39. Id. at 894–95.
40. Elizabeth A. Schneider, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
1003, 1021 (1993).
41. Id.
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a nonviable fetus.’ ” 42 Second, if the law does not place an undue bur-
den on the woman, then the law must have a rational purpose relating
to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting life.43 Essentially, if a
law is found to have the effect or purpose of placing a substantial ob-
stacle in front of the woman’s access to abortion pre-viability, it is in-
valid. If a state restriction does not place a substantial obstacle in
front of the woman’s ability to obtain an abortion pre-viability, then it
is acceptable as long as it is rationally related to the state’s interest in
protecting life.
II. STATE ABORTION LAWS POST-CASEY
Most state restrictions on abortion post-Casey have been very
similar to the laws that the Supreme Court upheld in Casey.44 These
have included laws requiring informed consent, parental consent for
minors, waiting periods, and providing information about the fetus.45
This may be due to the fact that because these laws were expressly
held as constitutional in Casey, states feel comfortable enacting them
without the threat of a judicial veto.46 However, some restrictions
have stretched, or have even broken out of, the Casey mold. For ex-
ample, seven states have enacted laws that force a woman seeking an
abortion to first undergo an ultrasound.47 Three of these seven states,
Louisiana, Texas, and Wisconsin, require that an image of the fetus
be displayed during the ultrasound.48 The woman may look away from
the image, but the doctor is required, with some exceptions, to describe
the image of the fetus to the woman.49 Louisiana is the only state,
apart from H.B. 2036’s modification of Arizona abortion law, to require
that an ultrasound take place at least twenty-four hours in advance
of the abortion.50
The justification for this regulation is that the ultrasound require-
ment helps the woman to make an informed decision, but these laws
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Devins, supra note 5, at 1336 (“With the exception of partial-birth abortion, post-
Casey legislation is generally modeled after Pennsylvania’s statutory provisions.”).
45. Id. at 1320, 1328, 1340.
46. See id. at 1335 (“Casey both added legitimacy to those provisions it upheld and sig-
naled to lawmakers that there were identifiable boundaries to how far they could constitu-
tionally regulate abortion.”).
47. State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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can also be seen as an attempt to personify the fetus.51 This author ar-
gues that personification of the fetus is a break from traditional Casey
laws regarding informed consent and time, place, and manner restric-
tions. The established Casey time, place, and manner distinctions
regulate the circumstances of an abortion, in at least a superficially
neutral manner. However, an attempt to personify the fetus for the
mother seems based on morality. Fetal personification bears little on
the condition of the abortion procedure, and walks the line of “in-
formed consent” very tightly. If placed under the informed consent
category, the “information” supposedly communicated has troubling
connotations if based on the morality of abortion rather than the ef-
fects of the medical procedure.
Another realm in which states have arguably departed from the
traditional Casey laws is in the enactment of fetal pain laws.52 These
require doctors to inform a woman seeking an abortion twenty-two
weeks into the pregnancy about the possibility of fetal pain.53 While
these laws clearly fit into the informed consent category of traditional
Casey regulations, they may be contrary to the decision in Casey,
which requires that the information given to the mother be “truthful
and not misleading.” First, the information may be an attempt to
personify the fetus, suggesting a moral rather than medical compo-
nent to the information. Second, the information may be considered
misleading and not truthful because most medical evidence suggests
that fetal pain is not likely to occur until the twenty-ninth week.54
A similar example of a stretch of the “truthful and not misleading”
requirement is a law in South Dakota that requires the doctor to
inform the woman that the fetus inside her is a living being and
suggests that abortion will cause posttraumatic stress disorder.55
Whereas the ultrasound requirements are arguably an attempt to
personify the fetus, the South Dakota law informing the woman that
the fetus is a living being is a clear attempt to personify the fetus and
inject morality into the “informed consent” regulation. The require-
ment can appear more like a judgment on the woman rather than a
regulation of a medical procedure. South Dakota further requires that
women seeking abortions be told that the procedure carries with it an
increased risk of suicide.56 This is in spite of the fact that “ ‘[e]very
51. Devins, supra note 5, at 1341.
52. Id. at 1342.
53. Id.
54. Id. (“Fetal pain laws . . . push slightly at the boundaries of Casey’s ‘truthful and not
misleading’ requirement. . . . [T]he weight of medical evidence suggests that fetal pain is
not likely to occur until roughly the twenty-ninth week . . . ”).
55. Id.
56. Laura Bassett, South Dakota Law Linking Abortion, Suicide Upheld In Court,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 24, 2012, 6:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/24
/south-dakota-abortion-suidice-law-appeals-court_n_1699615.html.
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reputable researcher and medical organization has determined that
there is no sound scientific evidence that shows a cause and effect re-
lationship between abortion and suicide.’ ” 57 While the Supreme Court
has not yet ruled on this South Dakota provision, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has upheld the law as truthful and not misleading.58
In doing so, they interpreted the language “increased risk,” extremely
broadly,59 essentially acknowledging the evidence for any increase is
virtually non-existent.
The final outliers of post-Casey abortion regulations are Targeted
Regulation of Abortion Providers, or TRAP laws.60 TRAP laws are fa-
cially neutral regulations of places that perform abortions. These laws
regulate everything from required equipment, to a specified size of
the abortion clinic, to zoning restrictions. Some TRAP laws combine
to create a maze of requirements.61
TRAP laws can generally be placed into three categories:
(1) health facility licensing schemes, (2) ambulatory surgical center
requirements, and (3) hospitalization requirements.62 Health facility
licensing requirements are the broadest category of TRAP laws. These
are the laws that specify how large or small the building must be, how
to add licensing fees to abortion providers, and sometimes even how
to permit warrantless searches of abortion clinics.63 Around twenty-
two states have some laws that would fit into the category of health
facility licensing requirements.64
A second category of TRAP laws is ambulatory surgical center
requirements. These laws equate abortion providers with ambulatory
surgical centers and force abortion providers to follow the same laws
regulating ambulatory surgical centers.65 These are less common than
health licensing schemes, with only about ten states forcing abortion
providers to meet these requirements.66
57. Id. (quoting Sarah Stoesz).
58. Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d
889, 905 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Accordingly we hold that the suicide advisory is non-misleading
and relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion.”).
59. See id. at 900–05.
60. Devins, supra note 5, at 1342.
61. See id. at 1343 (“[A] Missouri law mandating that an abortion provider be licensed
as an ambulatory surgical center, be located within thirty miles of a hospital, and adhere
to physical plant requirements (including lighting, room dimension, even the number of
wall outlets and windows).”).
62. See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP): Avoiding the Trap, CTR.
FOR REPROD. RIGHTS (Nov. 1, 2007), http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/targeted
-regulation-of-abortion-providers-avoiding-the-trap.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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The final and most controversial categories of TRAP laws are hos-
pitalization requirements. These laws usually require that after the
second trimester, the abortion must be done in a hospital, rather than
an abortion clinic.67 These laws are different from other TRAP provi-
sions in that they place an outright ban on abortion clinics performing
abortions past a certain gestational age.68 It poses an additional prob-
lem for women seeking abortions because many hospitals are not
equipped to perform abortions.69 Only about four states have enforce-
able hospitalization requirements.70 However, as of 2007, twelve states
have hospitalization requirements that have been rendered unenforce-
able by State officials or court decisions.71
While facially neutral, the laws have likely the intent,72 and often
effect, of forcing medical facilities to stop providing abortions. For
example, due to TRAP laws in Arizona, Planned Parenthood was
forced to stop providing abortions in the city of Flagstaff.73 After the
TRAP laws, Planned Parenthood was only able to perform abortions
in Maricopa and Pima Counties, which comprise the Phoenix and
Tucson metropolitan areas, respectively, leaving out about a million
and a half inhabitants of Arizona.74 While some TRAP laws have been
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Amy (MS), CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS
(Dec. 9, 2008), http://reproductiverights.org/en/case/jackson-womens-health-organization
-v-amy-ms (summarizing a court ruling of Mississippi law requiring second trimester abor-
tions be performed in hospitals that would have effectively banned abortion past the second
trimester because no hospital in the state provided abortions).
70. See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP): Avoiding the Trap, supra
note 62 (referring to Alaska, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Nevada).
71. Id.; see also Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
476 (1983) (pre-Casey Supreme Court decision invaliding as unconstitutional a Missouri
statute requiring that after twelve weeks of pregnancy, abortions must be performed in a
hospital rather than abortion clinic); Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Amy, 330 F. Supp.
2d 820 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (invalidating state hospitalization requirement because it would
effectively ban abortions before viability).
72. Barry Yeoman, The Quiet War on Abortion, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 2001), http://www
.motherjones.com/politics/2001/09/quiet-war-abortion (“The real motive for TRAP laws, say
Grimes and others, is to force clinics to spend money on costly renovations for fear of being
shut down by the state. This drives up the cost of abortions, placing them out of reach for
some women. It could even force providers to shut down entirely.”).
73. Howard Fischer, Planned Parenthood to End Abortions in Flagstaff, AZDAILYSUN
.COM (Aug. 18, 2011), available at http://azdailysun.com/news/local/govt-and-politics
/planned-parenthood-to-end-abortions-in-flagstaff/article_ad6e4b5a-c9d3-11e0-a709-001c
c4c002e0.html.
74. Compare Arizona State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 27, 2013),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04000.html (stating the 2012 population of Arizona
was 6,553,255), with United States Census Bureau, Maricopa County State & County
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04/04013.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (stating the estimated population of the Phoenix metropolitan
area is 3,880,244), State & Pima County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quick
facts.census.gov/qfd/states/04/04019.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (stating the estimated
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interpreted by the courts as creating a de facto ban on abortion under
certain circumstances, and thus invalid under the Constitution,75 most
TRAP laws have not been interpreted by the courts as creating an
“undue burden.” Therefore, although TRAP laws are outside the realm
of the laws expressly upheld in Casey, their continued presence sug-
gests that, at least in most circumstances, they are a valid state re-
striction on abortion procedure.
III. ARIZONA HOUSE BILL 2036
A. The Law
Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed Arizona House Bill 2036
(H.B. 2036) into law in April 2012,76 and it was set to go into effect in
August of 2012.77 The bill makes several changes to abortion law in
Arizona. Notably, the bill contains provisions regarding abortion facil-
ities (TRAP laws), time requirements, ultrasounds, informed consent,
how early into the pregnancy a woman can receive an abortion, and
punishments for physicians who perform abortions contrary to the
State regulation.78
The bill requires that abortion clinics post visible signs in the
waiting, consultation, and procedure rooms which state that it is un-
lawful for a person to force a woman to have an abortion.79 Before
H.B. 2036, it was mandatory in Arizona that before a woman had an
abortion she underwent an ultrasound procedure.80 H.B. 2036 adds
the requirement that the ultrasound must be done at least twenty-four
hours before the abortion,81 necessitating an additional visit to a medi-
cal facility or an overnight stay.
If a woman wishes to seek an abortion because the fetus has been
diagnosed with a terminal condition, H.B. 2036 requires that she be
informed at least twenty-four hours before the abortion of all perinatal
population of the Tucson metropolitan area is 989,469). Subtracting the combined popula-
tions of Tucson and Phoenix, 4,869,713, from the population of Arizona, 6,553,255, leaves
1,683,542 people remaining.
75. Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Amy (MS), supra note 69.
76. Alia Beard Rau, Brewer Signs Bill Banning Most Abortions After 20 Weeks, AZ
CENTRAL (Apr. 12, 2012), available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/2012
/04/12/20120412arizona-abortion-bill-20-weeks-law-brewer.html.
77. Kelly Cozzone, New Law in Arizona States ‘Pregnancy Begins Two Weeks Before
Conception,’ EXAMINER.COM (Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/new-law
-arizona-states-pregnancy-begins-two-weeks-before-conception (discussing the law which
would have gone into effect in August of 2012).
78. H.B. 2036, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012).
79. Id.
80. State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 47.
81. Ariz. H.B. 2036.
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hospice services available.82 If a woman wishes to seek an abortion be-
cause the fetus has a non-terminal condition, H.B. 2036 requires that
the doctor give the woman up-to-date medical information regarding
the potential outcomes of the condition.83
H.B. 2036 also requires that the gestational age of the fetus be de-
termined before an abortion is performed.84 In order to determine the
gestational age, the doctor is permitted to ask any question of the
woman.85 This could require women seeking abortions to dredge up
painful or embarrassing memories. Under the broad language, the doc-
tor would be permitted to ask about the exact date of conception or
even the exact circumstances under which the fetus was conceived.
For example, if someone were the victim of repeated sexual abuse,
the doctor could ask about each specific instance of rape to determine
which incident was most likely the date of conception. It would also be
possible for the doctor to ask extremely intimate questions regarding
the nature of the sexual conduct in order to determine which instance
most likely resulted in conception.
One of the most glaring departures from the Casey and even the
Roe molds is that H.B. 2036 departs completely from the standard of
viability. Rather than the viability standard, H.B. 2036 stipulates that
if the gestational age of the fetus is more than twenty weeks, abortion
is prohibited.86 Finally, H.B. 2036 permits the woman upon whom the
abortion was performed, the husband of the woman, and the mother’s
parents, if the mother is a minor, to sue the physician in the event
that an abortion is provided in violation of State law.87 If the physician
is found liable, he/she is subject to a Class 1 Misdemeanor and may
have his/her medical license suspended or even revoked.88
B. Isaacson v. Horne
Soon after Governor Brewer signed H.B. 2036 into law, opponents
sued the Attorney General of Arizona seeking a preliminary injunction
and declaratory judgment under the grounds that the law was uncon-
stitutional.89 The plaintiff argued that by prohibiting abortion before
twenty weeks, the law abandoned the viability standard of Casey.90
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Ariz. H.B. 2036.
88. Id.
89. Isaacson v. Horne, 884 F. Supp. 2d 961, 962 (D. Ariz. 2012), rev’d, 716 F.3d 1216
(9th Cir. 2013).
90. Id. at 966–67.
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The District Court disagreed, finding that the law was merely a “limit
on some previability abortions between 20 weeks gestational age and
viability.” 91 The court found that the law did not present a substantial
burden to pre-viability abortions because it still permitted women to
obtain abortions before twenty gestational weeks, reasoning, “while
H.B. 2036 may prompt a few women, who are considering abortion as
an option, to make the ultimate decision earlier than they might other-
wise have made it, H.B. 2036 is nonetheless constitutional because it
does not ‘prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to
terminate her pregnancy.’ ” 92 The court ruled in favor of the state and
denied injunctive and declaratory relief.93
On May 21, 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision and ruled H.B. 2036 unconsti-
tutional.94 Reasoning “a prohibition on abortion at and after twenty
weeks does not merely ‘encourage’ women to make a decision regard-
ing abortion earlier than Supreme Court cases require; it forces them
to do so,” 95 the court found the restriction on abortion after twenty
gestational weeks was an unconstitutional violation of the right to ob-
tain a pre-viability abortion.96 The court emphasized, “[u]nder control-
ling Supreme Court precedent, a woman has the right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy at any point before viability—not just before
twenty weeks gestational age,” 97 finding that H.B. 2036 was, “uncon-
stitutional under an unbroken stream of Supreme Court authority,
beginning with Roe and ending with Gonzales.” 98
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 2036
A. House Bill 2036 Compared to Other Post-Casey State Laws
While H.B. 2036 is in several ways a novel piece of legislation, it
still has ties to the Pennsylvania restrictions upheld in Casey. This is
reflective of states’ desire to craft provisions similar to those expressly
upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court. Additionally, the
areas in which H.B. 2036 departs from typical post-Casey legislation
mostly conform to other states’ departures. This is also possibly due
91. Id. at 968.
92. Id. at 969 (quoting Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2006)).
93. Id. at 972.
94. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 884 F. Supp. 2d 961
(D. Ariz. 2012).
95. Id. at 1227.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1231.
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to a desire to not stand out too far from existing norms. However, the
twenty-four hour waiting period attached to the already strong ultra-
sound requirement makes Arizona and Louisiana the only states to
have such a comprehensive ultrasound requirement package.99
H.B. 2036’s biggest departure, however, is its prohibition on abor-
tions for fetuses that are older than twenty gestational weeks. As this
Note will show, because of current medical technology and incentives
in other parts of the bill for the doctor to overestimate rather than
underestimate the age of the fetus, in practice there will be a prohibi-
tion on fetuses older than eighteen weeks rather than twenty weeks.100
Eighteen weeks is well before the average time of viability, which is
currently at around twenty-four weeks, with only around 30% of chil-
dren born at twenty-three weeks surviving, and slightly more than
half surviving at twenty-four weeks.101
1. The Timed Ultrasound Requirement
H.B. 2036’s requirement for a twenty-four hour waiting period
after the ultrasound is a departure from typical post-Casey regula-
tions. Waiting periods alone are not new or novel. In fact, they fit
exactly in the mold of Casey restrictions, as a waiting period was one
of the laws expressly upheld in Casey.102 The rationale behind the
waiting period was to allow the woman to properly contemplate her
decision.103 However, the waiting period can take on a slightly different
rationale when combined with the ultrasound.
As previously mentioned, it is possible that the ultrasound is an
attempt to personify the fetus.104 If that is the case, then the waiting
period is an attempt to force the woman to contemplate the personi-
fication of the fetus, or at the very least, contemplate the abortion in
light of any new feelings of personification she may have for the fetus.
The law is also different from typical waiting requirements in that
it requires women to review individualized information. The law up-
held in Casey required patients to wait a day after receiving general-
ized abortion information,105 which is entirely different from a patient
receiving her own results from a medical procedure. H.B. 2036 ignores
this distinction by creating a requirement that a woman wait after
99. State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 47.
100. See infra Part IV.A.4.
101. Neonatal Death, MARCH OF DIMES, http://www.marchofdimes.com/loss/neonatal
-death.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
102. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 886–87 (1992).
103. Id. at 885.
104. State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 47.
105. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.
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receiving the results of her own ultrasound, rather than after receiving
generalized information on the abortion procedure. Viewed in this
light, H.B. 2036 is different from the simple dissemination of informa-
tion and the ability to ponder that information at issue in Casey.
2. Facilities Providing Abortion Must Post Certain Signs
One provision in H.B. 2036 requires that signs stating that it is
unlawful to force a woman to have an abortion be posted in the wait-
ing, operating and consultation rooms. This can be viewed as an exten-
sion of the informed consent approved in Casey. It can also be seen as
a TRAP provision, which although outside of the traditional Casey
restrictions, is common.106
TRAP provisions range in how idiosyncratic they are, from impos-
ing certain fees on abortion clinics, to requiring that janitor closets in
abortion clinics be a certain size.107 Most TRAP laws have been upheld
as Constitutional restrictions on abortion rights, and those that have
been struck down usually require that abortions of a certain gesta-
tional age be performed in a hospital, rather than an abortion clinic.108
The posted sign requirements in H.B. 2036 are outside of the
restrictions that Casey expressly permitted.109 They fit in well with
many of the TRAP provisions that states have enacted post-Casey.
This is one of the few examples in which a regulation may be outside
of the Casey framework, but is still a legal restriction on abortion.
There is a possibility that the law may be seen as too high a bur-
den, and therefore unconstitutional, similar to the requirements that
certain abortions be performed in a hospital. On the other hand, if
TRAP provisions are seen on a spectrum from least to most restrictive,
the posted sign requirements would be closer to the least restrictive,
as it does not directly affect the abortion procedure and would not cost
the abortion clinic a significant amount of time or money.
3. The Doctor Must Inform the Woman of the Medical Prognosis
of the Fetus
Under H.B. 2036, if a woman wishes to have an abortion because
the fetus has a terminal condition, the doctor is required to inform her
106. See And Then There Was One, ECONOMIST (Sept. 8, 2012), available at http://www
.economist.com/node/21562215 (explaining how pro-life advocates have turned to TRAP
laws as a method of regulating abortion out of existence).
107. TRAP Bills, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, http://www.prochoice.org/policy/states/trap
_laws.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
108. See Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000);
see also Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP): Avoiding the Trap, supra
note 62.
109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881–87.
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of prenatal hospice services available.110 If the woman wishes to have
an abortion because of a non-lethal condition, the doctor is required to
tell the woman the current medical outlook for that condition.111 All of
this must take place at least twenty-four hours before the procedure.112
At first glance, these restrictions are in the same mold as the
informed consent and time requirements of Casey.113 However, H.B.
2036 breaks again from the requirements in Casey by requiring the
woman to state a reason for obtaining an abortion.
Of note is that the law does not explain how the doctor is to deter-
mine the reason the woman is seeking an abortion.114 Combined with
the other provisions in H.B. 2036 allowing either the husband or par-
ents, if the woman is a minor, to sue a doctor for violation of these
rules,115 it is possible to imagine the following scenario: A doctor per-
forms an abortion on a woman. The woman neglects to tell the doctor
that she is seeking the abortion because the fetus will be born with a
non-fatal illness. Because she did not know of the motivation, the doc-
tor did not inform the woman of the current medical outlook regarding
the disease twenty-four hours before the procedure. The husband of
the woman, knowing that she sought the abortion because of the
fetus’s non-fatal illness, is now able to sue the doctor in civil court,
and the doctor may have his license suspended or revoked.
This section of H.B. 2036 is an example of how states have tried
to stretch the existing Casey regulations. This fits well within the
mold of “informed consent” regulations, however it is not simply infor-
mation about the abortion procedure, like the Pennsylvania law at
issue in Casey. The trouble with this section of H.B. 2036 is its applica-
tion alongside the rest of the bill. The patient would be required to
inform the doctor performing the abortion that the fetus has a certain
illness, and if she did not, the doctor would be liable. However, because
the information given in return appears to be a truthful prognosis and
outlook for the particular disease, it would not likely run afoul of the
Casey requirement that information be truthful and not misleading.
4. The Gestational Age of the Fetus Must Be Less than
Twenty Weeks
Of all the provisions in H.B. 2036, the largest departure from
the Casey framework is the requirement that abortions may not be
110. H.B. 2036, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–85.
114. Ariz. H.B. 2036.
115. Id.
188 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 20:173
performed on a fetus that is older than twenty weeks.116 This is an
express prohibition of abortion past a certain date, rather than a regu-
lation of abortion procedures. While the letter of H.B. 2036 states that
abortions may not be performed after twenty weeks, in practice the
cutoff date is likely to be eighteen weeks.117 This is because the bill de-
termines the gestational age of the fetus as beginning from the last
menstrual cycle,118 and it imposes harsh penalties on doctors for break-
ing any of the State regulations.119 Therefore, there is an incentive for
the doctor to overestimate the age of the fetus.
Even if the age of the fetus were restricted to twenty weeks rather
than eighteen, H.B. 2036 would be a departure from the framework in
every Supreme Court decision regarding abortion dating back to Roe,
which permitted abortion to be prohibited post-viability.120 Most states
have interpreted viability to be a flexible standard, and they have
decided it begins at around twenty-four weeks.121 Some of the more
experimental states, such as Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Idaho,
Nebraska, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, North Dakota, and
Oklahoma have determined viability as beginning as early as twenty
weeks.122 Eighteen weeks, by comparison, is an unprecedented en-
croachment on the time a woman is allowed to seek an abortion.
Not only is this time frame earlier than any state in the union, it
is also a departure from the viability standard because it is a whole-
sale ban on abortion during a time in which the fetus is not viable.
The earliest that a child has been born in the United States and sur-
vived outside of the mother is at twenty-one weeks.123 It questionable
116. Id.
117. John Celock, Arizona Abortion Bill: Legislators Pass Three Bills, Including One
That Redefines When Life Begins, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 12, 2012, 4:56 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/10/az-abortion-bills-arizona-gestational-age_n_1415715.html;
David Edwards, Arizona Bill Would Declare Pregnancy 2 Weeks Before Conception, RAW
STORY (Apr. 4, 2012, 12:25 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/04/04/arizona-bill-would
-declare-pregnancy-2-weeks-before-conception/.
118. Ariz. H.B. 2036.
119. Id.
120. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (“Before viability, a State ‘may not
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.’ ”
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879)); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
870 (1992) (“We conclude the line should be drawn at viability.”); Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (“viable—an end which all concede is
legitimate.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“With respect to the State’s im-
portant and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.”).
121. State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 47.
122. Id.
123. Amanda Cable, The Tiniest Survivor: How the ‘Miracle’ Baby Born Two Weeks
Before the Legal Abortion Limit Clung to Life Against All Odds, DAILY MAIL ONLINE
(May 22, 2008), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1021034/The-tiniest
-survivor-How-miracle-baby-born-weeks-legal-abortion-limit-clung-life-odds.html.
2013] THE CREATION OF AN UNDUE BURDEN 189
therefore, that some states consider viability to start as early as
twenty weeks, and it certainly calls into question how well H.B. 2036
conforms to the required standard of not prohibiting abortion before
viability. If the earliest a fetus has ever survived outside of the womb
is twenty-one weeks, and on average, most fetuses do not survive ear-
lier than twenty-four weeks,124 a fetus born at eighteen or even twenty
gestational weeks cannot be said to have a realistic standard for sur-
viving. H.B. 2036 therefore moves the cutoff date for abortions too
early, and encroaches upon the viability standard laid out in Casey.
5. The Woman, the Woman’s Spouse, and the Woman’s
Parents, if She Is a Minor, May Sue a Doctor for Violating
These Restrictions
H.B. 2036 increases the number of people who can sue a doctor for
violation of state restrictions on abortion.125 While expanding who can
sue a doctor for performing an abortion in violation of regulations,
H.B. 2036 simultaneously makes a doctor in violation of Arizona abor-
tion law potentially liable for a class-one misdemeanor and subject to
license suspension or revocation.126 This type of legislation is entirely
apart from the typical Casey mold of abortion restrictions as it focuses
on the doctor rather than the woman receiving the abortion. Other
states, such as Tennessee, have laws that place similar penalties on
physicians performing abortions in violation of State law.127 While it
is outside of the laws expressly upheld under Casey, it is not likely
that these laws place an undue burden on a woman’s ability to obtain
an abortion. It can be seen, however, as acting in parity with the rest
of the State’s abortion laws, as a means of ensuring that it will be
carried out in its strictest sense, and perhaps even further than the
law requires.
For example, because current medical technology does not allow
for a doctor to determine the gestational age inside of two weeks,128
the increased penalty incentivizes doctors to overestimate rather than
underestimate the twenty-week gestational period. The penalties also
leave the doctor open to potential lawsuits in the case when a woman
seeking an abortion because the fetus has been diagnosed with a fatal
or non-fatal disease, but neglects to tell the doctor.
124. Id.
125. H.B. 2036, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2012).
126. Id.
127. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-202 (2011).
128. Celock, supra note 117.
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B. The Restrictions that House Bill 2036 Places on Access to
Abortion Constitute an Undue Burden on a Woman’s Right to
Seek an Abortion
The restrictions that H.B. 2036 places on women’s access to abor-
tion are enough to constitute an undue burden within the two-step
Casey framework. The timing requirement on the ultrasound necessi-
tates an additional visit to the doctor, the requirement that a woman
seeking an abortion because of a fatal or non-fatal health concern
regarding the fetus be informed of the medical outlook twenty-four
hours before the procedure could further necessitate another doctor
visit, and finally the gestational age requirement expressly prohibits
abortion pre-viability.
1. The Ultrasound Requirement
Laws regarding ultrasounds have existed in several states129 for
a number of years,130 so it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will con-
sider them an undue burden. While only eight states require women
to get an ultrasound,131 the Supreme Court has not decided whether
these requirements have the purpose or effect of deterring abortions.
It could be argued that they are simply an extension of Casey regula-
tions regarding information. This could be countered, however, by the
fact that they have the purpose of deterring abortions because their
sole purpose is an attempt to personify the fetus for the woman and
thereby stop her from receiving an abortion. Another argument could
be that they have the effect of preventing abortions; however, this does
not appear to be the case.132
The addition of the time requirement creates a host of further
problems that constitute an undue burden. Under the Casey defini-
tion, an undue burden exists if the law has “the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abor-
tion of a nonviable fetus.”133 The requirement that the ultrasound
129. State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 47.
130. See Erik Eckholm, Ultrasound: A Pawn in the Abortion Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25,
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/sunday-review/ultrasound-a
-pawn-in-the-abortion-wars.html (stating that states have passed ultrasound restrictions
since 2005).
131. State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 47.
132. Eckholm, supra note 130 (“ ‘Women are having abortions because of the conditions
of their lives, their economic situation, their partner situation, their age . . . and the ultra-
sound doesn’t change that.’ ”) (quoting sociologist Tracy Weitz regarding a study indicating
the ultrasound does not change women’s minds).
133. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
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must be performed at least one day before the abortion necessitates
that the woman make at least two appointments with the physician.
This additional appointment will have the effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of women who are not able to take
the time off work, women who wish their abortion to remain secret,
women who cannot financially afford an additional doctor visit, unin-
sured women who cannot afford an ultrasound procedure and a doctor
visit, and women who live in rural areas. It is important to note that
many of these groups overlap, thereby exacerbating just how “substan-
tial” this obstacle is.
While the Supreme Court upheld a twenty-four hour time require-
ment for the information given to the mother in Casey,134 in spite of
several of these same objections,135 the ultrasound, rather than the
simple dissemination of information, presents stronger obstacles in
several key ways. First, in Casey, the Court noted the problems a
poorer woman might face by having to visit the doctor twice, but did
not find that it was sufficiently problematic to constitute an undue
burden.136 However, in the case of H.B. 2036, the added visit is not
simply a meeting with a doctor; it is a much more costly medical pro-
cedure.137 This has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
way of women seeking abortions by requiring a large expenditure.
Furthermore, because there was already an ultrasound require-
ment in place before H.B. 2036 went into effect,138 the purpose of the
added time requirement appears to place an obstacle for the woman
in obtaining her abortion. It can be argued that the purpose is to give
women time to think about the decision to abort, thereby fitting in
with the informed consent model of Casey regulations, but, as previ-
ously stated, the motivations for waiting periods after ultrasound
are suspect.139
Second, largely due to pre-existing TRAP laws, abortion clinics in
Arizona only exist in the two largest metropolitan areas in the states:
134. Id. at 887.
135. Id. at 885–86.
136. Id.
137. See Maggie Fox, Survey Shows Americans Pay A Lot More for Health Care, NAT’L
J. (Mar. 4, 2012), available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/healthcare/survey-shows
-americans-pay-a-lot-more-for-health-care-20120304 (reporting survey findings that routine
doctor visits average $89); Stephen Rampur, Ultrasound Cost, BUZZLE, http://www.buzzle
.com/articles/ultrasound-cost.html (May 12, 2010) (explaining the average cost of an ultra-
sound is approximately $200).
138. See Associated Press, Ariz. Panel Endorses Abortion Ultrasound Mandate, AZ
CAPITOLTIMES.COM (Feb. 3, 2011), available at http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2011/02/03
/ariz-panel-endorses-abortion-ultrasound-mandate/ (discussing the enactment of the 2011
law requiring an ultrasound before an abortion).
139. See infra Part II.
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Phoenix and Tucson.140 This means that if a woman living Flagstaff,
a city with a population of roughly 65,000,141 wishes to have an abor-
tion, she would have to drive around one hundred and fifty miles just
to obtain the procedure. With the introduction of the twenty-four hour
ultrasound waiting period, that woman would now be required to
make that trek twice. The distance alone is a difficult obstacle to over-
come, but if the woman were poor, the cost of transportation combined
with the cost of the two procedures would be a substantial obstacle in
front of her ability to undergo the procedure.
2. The Requirement that the Gestational Age of the Fetus Be
Under Twenty Weeks
It is helpful at this stage to revisit the wording of the Supreme
Court’s definition of an undue burden. In Casey, the Court said that
an undue burden would have, “the purpose or effect of placing a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus.”142 A woman seeking to abort a viable fetus may be
subject to substantial obstacles, up to and including outright prohibi-
tion, without suffering a violation of her constitutional rights.
H.B. 2036, however, breaks away from the viability standard. Not
only does it specify a cutoff date regardless of viability,143 but that cut-
off date is weeks before viability. As previously stated, the record for
earliest surviving born child is twenty-one weeks.144 Even using the
most generous definition possible and saying that this “miracle
baby”145 should set the standard for viability, it would still put H.B.
2036 in the position of prohibiting abortion a full three weeks before
viability. Even if it were assumed that the doctor would not overesti-
mate the gestational period as he is incentivized to do and the abor-
tion is permitted after twenty weeks of pregnancy, the law would still
prohibit abortion of a nonviable fetus. This is directly contrary to the
specific language of the Supreme Court in Casey, and the entire frame-
work of the viability standard.146
140. Howard Fischer, Planned Parenthood to End Abortions in Flagstaff, AZDAILYSUN
.COM (Aug. 18, 2011), available at http://azdailysun.com/news/local/govt-and-politics
/planned-parenthood-to-end-abortions-in-flagstaff/article_ad6e4b5a-c9d3-11e0-a709-001c
c4c002e0.html.
141. Census Facts, CITY OF FLAGSTAFF, http://www.flagstaff.az.gov/index.aspx?NID
=1095 (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
142. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
143. H.B. 2036, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012).
144. Cable, supra note 123.
145. Id.
146. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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One of the reasons cited by legislators for prohibiting abortion
after twenty weeks is that after twenty weeks a fetus can feel pain.147
However, this evidence has been disputed by major medical socie-
ties.148 Without this justification, there does not even appear to be a
rational basis for the pre-viability restriction. Therefore, even if the
law was not found to create an undue burden, it would still fail the
two-pronged Casey test.
The gestational restriction in H.B. 2036 poses additional problems
for women seeking abortions. A motivating factor in many abortions
are medical complications;149 however, many of these medical compli-
cations cannot be detected until twenty weeks or later in the gestation
period.150 Therefore, it may force women to carry fetuses to term even
if it is clear that they will die shortly after birth.151
CONCLUSION
Arizona House Bill 2036 is an example of how states have tried to
craft abortion restrictions in the mold of Casey, while simultaneously
attempting to push those boundaries. In stretching those boundaries,
H.B. 2036 has gone too far and created an undue burden for women
seeking abortions.
Notably, the bill has added a twenty-four hour waiting period
to the already restrictive ultrasound procedures.152 This will necessi-
tate a second visit to the doctor’s office. Combined with the TRAP
provisions currently in effect in Arizona that have forced abortion
providers to consolidate to the areas of Tucson and Phoenix, it leaves
women seeking an abortion who live in other cities, such as Yuma
or Flagstaff, with the prospect of making two trips of a few hundred
miles each. While a waiting period is one of the more traditional
Casey regulations, it takes on a new meaning as applied to the ultra-
sound requirement.
The time requirements in Casey were justified by giving the
woman the ability to process the general information about abortion
that she received in order to make an informed decision about her
147. Ariz. H. B. 2036.
148. Erik Eckholm, Lawsuit Tries to Block New Arizona Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES
(July 12, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/us/arizona-abortion-law-is
-challenged.html.
149. Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and
Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110, 112 (citing a study
that showed 13% of women have an abortion because of concerns about the health of the
fetus, and 12% of women have abortions because of concerns about their own health).
150. Argyro Syngelaki et al., Challenges in the Diagnosis of Fetal Non-Chromosomal
Abnormalities at 11–13 Weeks, 31 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 90, 98, 100 (2011).
151. Neonatal Death, supra note 101.
152. H.B. 2036, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012).
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medical operation. However, the waiting period for the ultrasound re-
quirement forces the woman to wait after receiving results from a
medical examination of her own body rather than general information
regarding abortion.
It also imposes a much more substantial financial burden on
women, especially those living in rural areas. Before H.B. 2036,
women had to pay for transportation to and from the abortion clinic,
as well as an ultrasound and the abortion procedure itself. Now, be-
cause of H.B. 2036, women will have to pay for transportation to and
from the doctor’s office twice, potentially facing higher costs due to
increased distances, an ultrasound, potentially an overnight stay, and
the abortion procedure. While likely not an undue burden on their
own, the TRAP provisions of H.B. 2036 may contribute to rising costs
of the abortion procedure and place additional costs on women seeking
abortions in Arizona.
Finally, permitting the time requirement would be a slippery
slope to moving far from the intent of informed consent. It is easy to
see a more conservative state such as South Dakota with its strong
abortion regulations implementing the twenty-four hour waiting pe-
riod for abortions. If this were combined with its other TRAP laws
regarding abortion—among other provisions, that the woman be told
the fetus is a living being—the requirements seem more like moral
judgments on the woman rather than allowing a patient to make an
adequately informed medical decision. Importantly for the Casey
analysis, H.B. 2036 places a substantial obstacle in front of a woman
seeking an abortion, with seemingly no other purpose than deterring
them from undergoing the procedure.
The bill also departs from every Supreme Court precedent regard-
ing abortion in that it entirely abandons the standard of viability. By
expressly prohibiting abortion after twenty weeks on paper, and poten-
tially eighteen weeks in practice, Arizona H.B. 2036 prohibits abortion
before a fetus is not only reasonably viable, but before any fetus has
ever survived outside of the mother’s womb.153 This is a direct viola-
tion of the often-repeated standard of viability. Supreme Court cases
from Roe to Casey to Carhart have sometimes dramatically changed
the Court’s approach to abortion regulations, but every single case
has affirmed that the state may not prohibit abortion until the mo-
ment of viability.154 As Casey noted, viability will change over time as
153. Cable, supra note 123.
154. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2006) (“Before viability, a State ‘may not
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.’ ”)
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992) (“Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition
of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect
the procedure.”).
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medical technology progresses. There may one day be a time when a
fetus can be said to be reasonably viable at twenty or even eighteen
weeks. Presently however, this is not the case.155
While viability is meant to be a flexible standard, the generally
accepted standard of twenty-four weeks more accurately reflects cur-
rent medical technology, as it is the point that a fetus is more likely
than not to survive outside of the mother’s womb. Even taking a nar-
row view of “reasonably likely to survive,” as less than half, but still a
significant amount, the cut-off for viability should be twenty-three
weeks, at which point the fetus has around a thirty-percent chance of
surviving outside of the mother.156 By either definition, the Arizona
Bill goes far over the line into the realm of viability. If abortions can
be prohibited earlier than any fetus has ever survived outside of the
womb, the viability framework has been abandoned.
The timed ultrasound requirement and gestational age limitation
of H.B. 2036 stretch the boundaries of post-Casey abortion restrictions
too far, creating a substantial burden for women seeking abortions.
The TRAP laws contained in H.B. 2036, are an example of laws out-
side of the Casey mold, but do not likely constitute an undue burden.
However, like the harsher penalties for doctor’s performing abortions
in violation of state law, they may create an undue burden when com-
bined with the other elements of H.B. 2036. The gestational age limi-
tation and timed ultrasound requirements of H.B. 2036 should be
invalidated, as they are clear constitutional violations. Any reviewing
court should closely examine the remaining provisions, with special
consideration given to their combined effect.
States will continue to experiment with new and novel abortion
legislation. It remains to be seen where the exact limits are for TRAP
laws, timing requirements, and other time, place, and manner restric-
tions. However, from Roe to Casey to Carhart, the Supreme Court has
been explicitly clear that abortion may not be prohibited before via-
bility. Arizona House Bill 2036 prohibits abortion before viability. The
law is therefore an unconstitutional restriction on a woman’s right to
receive an abortion.
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